In a career spanning five decades, Patrick Suppes has pursued a unique approach to the problems of language and learning. This book, with Colleen Crangle, is a reprise of much of the work on the philosophy of language. As the title indicates, the underlying model is of a robot that is to receive instructions (and later also instruction) in ordinary language. The philosophizing is made concrete through software simulations and some simple experiments with a physical robot. Although much of the material has appeared before, it is reworked Into a cohesive whole.
Any attempt to deal with such deep issues will involve simplifications, and it is instructive to follow the unfolding of complications. The starting point is quite conventional; attribute grammar with a semantics based on formal logic. But the demands of the robot domain quickly require the introduction of functional semantics for perception and action, which are not analyzed further, and for control primitives. Task requirements also push the authors to abandon the autonomy of syntax and to give a major role to intentionality, contextual readings, and the shared perceptions of speaker and hearer. Thus they are led to many of the core concerns of cognitive semantics and this becomes explicit in a chapter on geometry and spatial prepositions. Traditional issues concerning negation get extended in intriguing ways in the chapter that considers what it means to ask a robot to stop.
The work on learning is mostly recent, although the theme goes back to Suppes's original work in mathematical psychology. The model has the robot choose parameters of actions (distance, etc.) from probability distributions that get modified by verbal feedback. The final chapter describes on-going work on the learning of natural language from examples in the robot domain. By postulating pre-existing internal structures for each utterance, the problem is reduced to statistically associating surface forms with internal constructs. This problem is analyzed theoretically and on a small corpus. As in the rest of the book, the work is idiosyncratic. But anyone with a deep interest in the philosophy of language can benefit from following the progression of ideas on some of its most fundamental issues. --Jerome A. Feldman, International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley Semantics: Defining the Discipline Robert A. Hipkiss (California State University, Long Beach) Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995, xvii+123 pp; hardbound, ISBN 0-8058-2026-4, $29.95; paperbound, ISBN 0-8058-1593-7, $17.50 This short book is meant to introduce the discipline of semantics, which Hipkiss believes ought to be recognized as sui generis and not a component of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, or anything else. Nevertheless, he reveals a linguistic bias by defining semantics as "the study of word meanings" (p. 107). To create an insightful, usable introductory semantics text of a mere 130 pages (introduction and 10 chapters) would be a masterstroke. It is very difficult to write an introductory text of any length for a wideranging topic like semantics (in contrast with set theory or predicate calculus). The book begins with gusto, and moves from Plato to Wittgenstein within three pages, touches some aspects of linguistic semantics, and ends with a paean to Korzybski's general semantics--an ideological position on meaning in language that current theoretical semantics largely (and properly) ignores. There are too many significant gaps and factual errors for this book to be acceptable; I felt I was reading an essay by an enthusiastic undergraduate with many flashes of common sense but too little learning.
Some examples of naive and misleading or incorrect statements, and failure to discuss important matters arising will ground these criticisms:
• Chapter 8 asks "Is there a semantics for AI?" and answers "AI is showing that the computer is far more than a mechanical memory. It can learn and conceptualize. It can relate those concepts to language. It can, then, give semantic content to the words in its memory. This is a limited semantics, however, for it has, at best, a limited intentionality" (p. 96). I wish my computer could conceptualize!
• " [F] eature analysis selection [is] the favorite subject of Fillmore and other casegrammarians" (p. xv). (?!) • " Kripke (1980) sees the Morning and Evening Star as the same, contra Russell and Frege, but that is because he looks at the object by itself as though continually observed, not at it in its contexts in different manifestations" (p. 30).
• Hipkiss espouses Wittgenstein's meaning-as-use theory without discussing its ramifications, and implies that a semanticist requires no special training: "Ultimately we are forced to do what the lexicographers do, listen, read, and learn how words are actually used, in order to know what they mean to different people. The more we read and listen and practice different modes of discourse at various levels of abstraction the more finely tuned we become to the possible meanings of different words in different contexts. There is no substitute for that experience, although our dictionaries, to some extent, abridge that experience for us" (p. 107).
• Common sense leads Hipkiss astray: "Normally, we would not run through all the dictionary meanings of verb and noun when we see a word, for we have already been limited in our search by the context of the sentence" (p. 69). In fact, all senses are activated and then inappropriate ones suppressed--see Gernsbacher (1990) and references cited there.
• The claim that "propositions are, by deftnition, true statements" (p. xiii) needs discussion in an introductory textbook; at worst it makes a mockery of propositional logic, and at best should lead to discussion of what is meant by a true versus a false statement.
• It is incorrect that around 1970Jerrold Katz "developed in his generative semantics a system of semantic marking that explained, to some degree, the mental process of selecting various words and word order as we speak and read" (p. xiv). Katz was never a generative semanticist and although he once believed he was defining semantic competence in Chomsky's sense, and later the semantics of an abstract system, he specifically eschewed performance and processing models (see Katz 1966 Katz , 1972 Katz , 1981 .
• Erroneous is: "Wierzbicka (1991) created a pragmatics dictionary of English verbs" (p. 39). The correct reference is Wierzbicka 1987, and it presents the senses of speech act verbs, rather than their pragrnatics.
• Chapters 1-3 discuss conceptualization, subjective awareness, and relative truth, while dismissing "logic" as a means of accounting for these important aspects of semantics. Although Hipkiss writes "words... are symbols for concepts arrived at through experience" (p. 2), there is no discussion of cognitive or conceptual semantics.
• An insufficient grasp of logic seems to lie behind a number of statements in this book--for example, the discussion of quantification and the definite article (p. 16), and "were truth-conditional semantics to incorporate the possible and the probable, it would not have been such a narrow incursion into the worlds of language and thought" (p. 26). Hipkiss claims that possible-worlds semantics is needed, but contrasts it with truth-conditional semantics, thus ignoring its truthconditional basis. Nowhere is model-theoretic semantics so much as mentioned.
• There is far too little discussion or explanation in this book. For example, cases (thematic roles) are listed without exposition (p. 63). Chapter 9 lists titles of papers in Etc., the flagship journal of general semantics, but there is almost no discussion of them, nor any comparison of general semantics with theories of semantic structure and relations.
Such infelicities are just a sample. This is a book that should be approached with caution by anyone with a limited (or no) knowledge of semantics. True, no book is perfect, but too much of this one is either misleading or just plain wrong.--Keith Allan, Monash University Kripke, Saul. 1980 . Naming and Necessity. The book presents the formal underpinnings of reasoning about knowledge. It covers the defining of several varieties of multiagent systems, which are systems composed of several agents that perform actions and use reasoning about knowledge or, perhaps, just act like they do or can profitably be analyzed as such. The book discusses common knowledge and its relationship to agreement, including the paradox that common knowledge is needed for agreement but is essentially impossible to achieve. The book mentions some of the problems with logical omniscience and presents some formal systems that are not logically omniscient.
There are many examples in the book that make its content much easier to understand. The book is primarily written for use in courses, but would be useful for anyone with an interest in reasoning about knowledge and with some background in formal logic. It contains many exercises suitable for classroom use or self-study.
In summary, this is an extremely wellwritten book that covers a subject that is important to computational linguistics. I recommend it for anyone interested in situations that occur when one agent must rea- Paul Cohen has written a remarkable and valuable guidebook for those doing empirical research in artificial intelligence and other computational fields. This book differs in flavor from those devoted to experimental design or statistical methods in that all techniques are set firmly within motivated, compelling discussions of the scientific method and how it can be properly applied when the object of study is a complex computer program.
The book is organized as a progression through the experimental process, and brings together, in clear, approachable prose, discussions of research methodology, exploratory data analysis, experimental design, hypothesis-testing tools (traditional and computer-intensive), causal modeling of system behavior, and techniques for generalizing from data and analyses. Examples and case studies are abundant, drawing most heavily from real experiments in computational linguistics, machine learning, and planning.
Throughout the book, strategies for how to design and understand the experimental tasks are foremost; statistics are treated as tools for achieving these ends. For example, topics such as analysis of variance and factorial design, which are chapter headings in many texts, are discussed here in the context of how to explain system performance.
Computational linguists should be aware that despite its title, this book contains little discussion of probability, multidimensional scaling, learning algorithms, and other topics that are important for corpus-based language analysis but not necessarily for experimental design. Additionally, readers not familiar with AI should be warned that the book contains some AI-centric examples whose motivation is not well-explained, as well as frequent references to debates within AI on how to conduct and evaluate experiments. Another potential drawback, if one wishes to use this book as an instructional text, is the lack of practice problems. However, one could exercise the concepts learned by having students attempt to apply them to published research papers. The book begins at an introductory level, assuming no background in statistics, and although it develops many advanced techniques, once this material is mastered, supplementary references may be required (and Cohen usually supplies relevant pointers).
One could argue that there is no need for such a book, given the legions of existing expositions on scientific methodology and experimental design. However, Empirical Methods for Artificial Intelligence is useful not only because it is targeted at a computational audience, whose training so frequently and unfortunately does not include basic research methodology, but also because it presents the material in a clear, useful, mode m, and invit- The collection contains 13 papers that were classified by the program committee as belonging to the area of "Applications of logic to the study of natural language. "2 The editorial preface is extremely brief. No overview, comparative summary, or evaluation of the contribution of the individual papers is provided.
I would call the papers thin on data and heavy on theory. Only a few briefy address computability. The authors appear to be much more concerned and familiar with logic than with natural language. Two papers, "Optimization of deduction for multimodal logics" by Olivier Gasquet and "Implicit and explicit definability in modal and temporal logics" by Larisa Maksimova, do not discuss any data and do not contain any discussion about natural language whatsoever. Only one paper, "Dynamic aspect trees" by Jerry Seligman and Alice ter Meulen, discusses some real-looking data (although its source is not indicated), including a multiparagraph text.
Reading and understanding such extremely formal, long papers (all but one between 20 and 40 pages), is not an easy task, even for one accustomed to formal theories. The papers are journal-like--many report on mature research--but they do not appear to 1 The editors also use the term workshop when referring to this meeting.
have undergone a rigorous journal-like review.
The reader is often left wondering whether the ideas presented are new or whether they were reported elsewhere. Sometimes simpleto-fix stylistic problems, such as claims buried toward the end of the paper, significantly obscure the presentation. The omission of some very relevant references is often apparent, with few references to the work outside Europe. 3 For example, the paper "Are types needed for natural language?" by Fairouz Kamareddine, surprisingly does not reference Keenan and Faltz (1985) . Many papers discuss dynamic characteristics of their formalisms. The word dynamic here refers to step-by-step text interpretation accompanied by appropriate updates of information obtained from the text seen thus far. It would be interesting to know how these dynamic logics differ from some existing formal frameworks for processing natural language that view understanding of natural language as the process of knowledge update. It would also be interesting to know how these dynamic logics differ from the knowledge representation formalisms, including belief-revision systems, that have been proposed over the last decade in artificial intelligence.
While I liked fragments of many papers, I was generally not convinced by the arguments in support of the claimed advantages of the formalisms and even less so about their relevance or criticality for processing natural language.
My recommendations are as follows. I would not recommend this book to the general computational linguistics audience. Researchers who are concerned with handling large volumes of real linguistic data are highly unlikely to benefit from theories motivated by such artificial, toy examples as those discussed in this book. More-formally inclined researchers will probably find only selected papers to be of interest. I would recommend this book to those unfamiliar with European research on applied logic; 14 out of 18 authors are affiliated with European institutions and their research provides a good sample. I would also recommend this book 3 It is only fair to note that many American researchers are similarly guilty of largely ignoring European results. (INK-Belgium) Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1994, xviii+406 pp; hardbound, ISBN 90-5199-148-7 , no price listed "The aim of our study has been to describe the activities of the many organisafions, both public and private, that create the infrastructure within which languages are able to develop and interact on equal terms in multilingual Europe. Although developments in the United States and Japan have been mentioned, we have been interested primarily in describing activities in the European Community .... "The Language Industries Atlas will be of interest to a broad spectrum of language professionals including translators, interpreters, terminologists, teachers, computational lingnists, researchers and public and private organisations, and indeed to anyone interested in languages, from a planning, standards, infrastructural or technological perspective.
"The Atlas contains more than 1,000 descriptions of activities which play a role in 1994 . The Guidelines are the result of over six years' work by dozens of scholars from all over the world who were involved in TEI working groups, providing their conclusions concerning the optimal way to consistently and comprehensively encode a vast range of text types and features. As such, TEI P3 represents a pioneer effort in an area where only occasional and isolated attempts had been made before, and will certainly serve as the primary basis for encoding texts in electronic form for the foreseeable future.
• "There is a compelling reason for collecting this series of papers. The TEI is a pioneering effort; the TEI working groups were the first to comprehensively address the substantial intellectual problem of representing textual data in electronic form. They were faced with a vast array of new problems: it became immediately apparent that the development of a text encoding scheme demanded much more than assigning tag names to features, and included looking at the conceptual structure of texts and determining the commonalities across different text types. It also demanded finding the most consistent and effective ways to encode texts using the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML), which provides only the fundamental machinery for marking texts and provides for many alternative means to encode texts. Therefore, the work of participants in the TEI not only involved consideration of problems of text encoding that are likely to be with us for decades to come, but also required the development of a methodology, from scratch, for approaching these problems. These pioneering efforts, while likely to be refined and extended, should not be lost; they provide the intellectual basis upon which text encoding practices will build in the future. This collection is therefore also an attempt to document the course of these efforts. 
